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 This report seeks to inquire about the European Union, EU, and its need to employ a 
higher degree of integration in light of recent events. As of late, the EU has faced a series of 
crises of whose policies are unfamiliar in handling them properly. Albeit the issues are numerous 
and the dimensions concerning them vary, this report will focus on three: the mass migration of 
refugees, most notably from Syria, the recent United Kingdom referendum which resulted in a 
majority vote for seceding from the EU, and the need to renovate its current foreign and security 
policies. This report will examine the three key points through a content analysis method of a 












The world is fashioned and made up of a variety of international groups and 
organizations. The US, Canada, and Mexico form the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), further south there is the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and towards the 
East is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is apparent that nations can no 
longer expect to “economically grow” without being part of an international grouping. The rise in 
the formation of international alliances are most notably a result of the success from one of the 
initial international and most integrated partnerships, the European Union (EU).  
 The EU, then, is a model for groups such as those mentioned above: every decision they 
make is examined by its global audience. Despite its success, the EU has recently undergone 
severe events that have put their union to the test. The mass influx of refugees from the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), particularly asylum seekers from Syria attempting to flee the 
ongoing civil war, and the surprising turnout from the United Kingdom’s referendum which 
resulted in withdrawing from the EU are EU’s two greatest challenges.  
 Additionally, the EU is still mending the economic after-effects of the 2008 financial crisis 
that was felt throughout the union. Global economy was not prepared for a crisis of the 
magnitude and EU was no exception. The way in which it was handled, or mishandled, validated 
the need for a more integrated union; moreover, it is necessary for the EU to implement a fiscal 
union to develop an enhanced monetary union.  
 Finally, there is the issue of defense or more specifically a common foreign security policy 
(CFSP), that the EU must address. The recently elected American president, Donald Trump, has 
 
mentioned in several occasions his uncertainty of US participation in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). A rise in defense spending should also be considered inside the union as 
well, with the recent rise in terrorist attacks, such as the Bataclan massacre in 2015.  
 Accumulating these issues only asserts the rising pressure confronting the EU in regards 
to achieving a deeper integration among the remaining 27 members. It is crucial that these 
nations adhere to giving up a larger share of their national power to the supranational authority 
of the union and increase their level of cohesion on many elements. Failing to do so may result in 
dire consequences including additional member states voting to secede from the union, being 
unprepared for another global financial calamity, or find themselves without property security 
policies.  
 
A background and history of the European Union 
Although the European Union is a complex organism to dissect, it is vital to grasp the 
fundamental elements in order to understand the situation it is in. This section will provide the 
necessary details required to perceive this. The end of WWII left European nations with a high 
amount of skepticism among one another but above all in a dire need of economic repair. This 
distrust got in the way of rebuilding Europe; furthermore, conducting business with one another 
was costly with trade barriers and exchange rates.  
Cooperation between past opponents was unthinkable, until said out loud by Winston 
Churchill during a speech at the University of Zurich, calling for a need of a “United States of 
 
Europe”. Churchill, though, was to remain a spectator behind the lines of what was to come five 
years following his statement.  
During this time a powerful and developed nation was determined by their access to and 
production of coal and steel. Additionally, the obscurity of who will have access to these 
resources lead to fear of the possibility of attacks or another war(web).  As a means to control 
this the French foreign minister at the time, Robert Schuman presented a solution: rather than 
have multiple countries operating the coal and steel production, it should fall under the control 
of one supranational authority.  Insinuating that if a group of countries shared an economic 
interest, the probability of going to war would be lowered while commercial prosperity would 
rise and be facilitated, explain Peet and La Guardia (7-8).  With the aim of forming a more 
economically and politically united Europe along with establishing peace, the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) was formed in 1952.  
 The Coal and Steel resources of six countries were now controlled by this new 
community: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The first 
President of its high authority of the ECSC was a French diplomat Jean Monnet. In June of 1950, 
the Korean war launched, evoking the Communist threat that lay East of the ECSC (web). In 
response to this, Monnet submitted a proposal to the French National Assembly in the Fall of 
1950, advocating for a European Army, with eventual German involvement, that was to be 
administered under a supranational European authority. Unfortunately, the attempt in 
establishing a European Defense Community (EDC) was rejected by the assembly in August of 
1954. With no defense alliance, the focus was shifted to economics and trade.   
 
Realizing the economic gains when steel and coal trading was liberalized, ECSC members 
decided to extend the parameters of free trade, leading to the Treaty of Rome. This agreement 
was signed in 1957 and came into full effect the beginning of 1958, establishing a European 
Economic Community (EEC) and allowing for a common market among the six original countries 
to exist. Additionally, four institutions, which operate to this day, were established: the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ).  
 In summary, the EEC allowed for six different nations to integrate and establish easier 
access to trade amongst each other in order to achieve economic efficiency (web). The original 
intent of this treaty was that in exchange for sacrificing limited sovereignty, a unified Europe 
would lower business costs and the economy of participating countries would flourish as a result 
through creation of a Common Market. Although the majority of barriers to trade were 
eradicated, the issue of multiple currencies remained.  
 The newly established market allowed economies to grow, but one barrier remained that 
was impeding against markets achieving optimal results: the costly exchange rates between EEC 
members. Higher integration, in the form of a common currency was the next step.  The first 
ideas began in the 1950s from French economist Jacques Reuff.  Since then, arguments for the 
adoption of a single currency began, one of the first notable works was the Werner report in 
1971. Unfortunately, with the breakdown of Bretton woods, the onset of the Arab-Israeli War, 
the oil shock, and the global recession of the 1970s interrupted these plans (Peet and La 
Guardia, 10). Other measures to stabilize currencies were taken, but it wasn’t until the Delors 
that progress was achieved.  
 
 A former French Finance minister, Jacques Delors, was elected as President of the 
European Commission in 1985, with the goal to make the previous plan of a single currency a 
reality. The outcome was the Delors report, advocating for a monetary union through three 
stages: Complete the single market, prepare for the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB), 
ensure economic convergence, and fix exchange rates for the launch of the Euro (Peet and La 
Guardia, 11). The Delors commission additionally provided crucial support for laying the 
foundations of the establishment of the Common Market, in overseeing the Single European Act 
(SEA) of 1964. As the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome, SEA prompted the exchange 
from an unanimity, where everyone must be in agreement, to qualified majority voting, thus 
speeding up the process of European integration (Dinan et al., 24).  
This report later culminated the basis for the Maastricht Treaty, finalized and signed in 
December of 1991. This treaty laid the foundations for the EU we recognize today, beginning the 
process for integrating financially and progress towards more of a political union. There were 
many important reasons for establishing a single currency: France wanted to secure the rising 
influence of the German Deutschmark, Germany desired currency stability, others wanted 
political union, but the British request was to opt out. The implantation of a monetary union and 
a single currency appeared beneficial to the newly established European Union, but was carried 
out in a flawed manner that would later exacerbate when the global financial crisis hit in 2008.   
One of the largest shortcomings was the way the ECB was established. Following the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB, which was modeled after the strong Bundesbank, 
the central bank of Germany, was put in place. To start with, the ECB, whose goal was to 
promote price stability among all Eurozone members, was not given a single government or 
 
finance ministry to convey with. In simple terms, a supranational monetary union was formed for 
the eurozone, while fiscal policy remained at a national level; additionally, there was no 
democratic legitimacy monitoring the ECB and the actions it took.  
One final treaty of importance is the Lisbon treaty of 2009 which dealt with the 
development of external affairs handled not in the supranational form that was accustomed to 
the EU, but in a way that every member state retained the right to voice their opinion. (Yeşilada 
et. Al, 5). Further it laid out foundations for the establishment of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Most important of all, given current events, was the introduction of Article 50, 
which gives members the right to withdraw from the EU.  
The EU, as it stands today is the most integrated political and economic international 
group at the moment; regardless, it still faces a series of challenges and issues it needs to review. 
A monetary policy is controlling the Eurozone, but with fiscal policy at a national level without a 
strong authority to monitor their actions. The remaining 27 members are integrated but 
nevertheless, lack a common foreign security defense policy. The rise and unfortunately 
successful terrorist attacks, such as the 2016 Berlin attack, could have been prevented had there 
been stronger and a more shared common source of security. Finally, with the secession of the 
UK, the EU is limited in their military, causing a higher reliance on NATO than ever before. On 
this, German chancellor Angela Merkel herself has voiced her concerns regarding transatlantic 
relations, NATO, raising awareness of the increasing need to improve “security in the passport-
free Schengen travel zone” as well as the control of its borders or risk the structure to fail 
completely (web). A large remaining section of the EU is still to be convinced of this.  
 
 This thesis will analyze the mentioned issues the EU faces by examining the available 
content and data found in reputable news sources, current research, and from the nations and 
governments of the EU itself along with what its leaders have stated regarding the matters. 
Economic models and graphs will be used in order to support the theories mentioned in this 
report.  
 
The Flawed Architecture of the Maastricht treaty  
 The establishment for a common currency was inevitable for the ever-closer union, this 
step was accomplished with the Maastricht Treaty. Unfortunately, there were significant flaws in 
its design, ultimately plaguing the EU in later years when the global financial crisis hit. It is critical 
to take a step back and examine these flaws as well as examine the economic health of specific 
countries before the arrival of this crisis.  
 A significant report to consider is Canadian Economist Robert Mundell’s A Theory of 
Optimum Currency Areas. This analytical framework expresses the pros and cons of instituting a 
common currency; furthermore, it was a driving force for the launching of the common currency 
(Peet and La Guardia, 12). Mundell was well in support of a monetary union among different 
countries and believed that this was a possibility so long as the benefits outweighed the costs. 
The costs, Mundell explains, of implementing a monetary union, is the shift from a flexible 
exchange rate to a fixed exchange rate system. In an economy with a flexible exchange system, 
in the case of an asymmetrical financial shock, it would be treated by a change in the exchange 
 
rate or devalue their currency. When nations share the same currency however, this action is 
impossible.  
 Instead, the solution is to allow for the mobility of labor and capital: the common market 
of the EU. Should an economy begin to degrade, the labor force should have the ability to 
migrate to a higher economic performance in order to avoid nations with high levels of 
employment (web). Only through this would the benefits be higher than the costs of having 
diverse nations use the same currency. In theory, this meant that the EU would have a small risk 
of experiencing economies of low performance as stability of prices and employment should be 
maintained. However, despite the removal of trade barriers cultural barriers will always sturdily 
remain. Despite the freedom for workers to transfer, they are limited by their linguistic ability: 
someone who only speaks Greek, is unlikely to find employment in an environment dominated 
by Lithuanian. This blocked the ability of economies to stabilize as they normally would in a 
single nation. A political authority with power was needed to make up for this lack of auto-
stabilization, as with additional flaws.  
 There were issues regarding the convergence criteria as well but most important of all 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), formulated from German concerns about the mixed level of 
economies committing to the same currency (Dinan et al., 133). The guidelines for EU state 
members were ceilings of public debt of 60% of GDP and on budget deficits of 3% GDP. 
Additionally, this was done in the hopes of limiting Eurozone members to a small core group who 
would be financially responsible; in other words, keeping Italy and other countries out (Peet and 
La Guarida, 15).  Problems with this limit arose when it came to Belgium, and its public debt 
which had passed 100% of GDP. This prompted Germany and France to allow some flexibility in 
 
the original convergence criteria as Belgium was indispensable, thus allowing Italy, and Spain to 
join in as well so long as they make strong efforts in eventually meeting the criteria. The treaty, 
though, did not ensure the adoption of any economic reforms to address the criteria, thus 
allowing the Mediterranean countries to stay outside of the financial limits.  
 Finally, there is the case of the previously mentioned ECB. Despite taking over the 
monetary policy from national central banks, the ECB was under no obligation to act as a lender 
of last resort as it was not designed as such. This was particularly an issue when there was 
danger in the markets and no one to stabilize the economy by lending to governments. 
Additionally, limited provisions were given. The founders failed to foresee the potential of cross 
border banks excessively exchanging assets and liabilities (web). In the United States, regulations 
have restricted banks from growing too large or participating in high risk businesses. However, 
European governments encouraged national banks to engage in high amounts of activity, 
eventually leading to banks growing larger than their host economies (Authers, 23). They grew so 
large that in the case of one bank negatively performing, the destabilization travels throughout 
all banks in the union, and because of their extensive growth, would be difficult to rescue.   
 These cracks in the system were not straightforwardly noticeable in the beginning, in fact 
the euro and its financial integration was considered a success in its early years. EU citizens had 
adjusted to the new currency, macroeconomic stability appeared to have stabilized, cross-border 
trade had risen, and additional nations had opted for the new currency (Dinan et al, 133). It 




 In September of 2008 the investment banking firm, Lehman Brothers, declares 
bankruptcy, thus sparking the worst global crisis in recent history. Despite its origins in the 
United States the financial consequences reverberated internationally, across the Atlantic to the 
financially integrated EU. Once on track, the political and financial failure of individual countries 
resulting from the single currency integration were unveiled.  
 Prior to the Eurozone, each member state controlled their monetary and fiscal policy at a 
national level. It is important to understand the difference between the two, and how they work 
with one another, or better yet support each other, in order to recognize the severity of how the 
Eurozone crisis came to be. Monetary policy controls the money supply of an economy and 
decides how high or low the interest rates are for borrowing this money. On the other hand, 
fiscal policy holds the power to decide how much a government collects on taxes and how much 
of that money will be spent. When governments require more money than what they have 
collected they must borrow it, this key term is called deficit spending.   
 Before the Maastricht treaty, each country was susceptible to a high interest rate and a 
limited amount if they were financially vulnerable, such as Greece. This maintained security and 
lowered the risk of bankruptcy from government. This changed once a country was part of the 
monetary union, members all shared a same low interest rates and were capable of borrowing 
large amounts that would have otherwise been impossible. Eurozone members were sharing the 
benefits from being under the same monetary umbrella, however each state still managed their 
 
fiscal policy with no supervision. A lack of fiscal discipline was a root cause of the financial crisis 
(Peet and La Guardia, 30).  
  The group that is the Eurozone is made up of various countries who diverge in multiple 
elements. Countries, such as Spain, rushed to convergence even though it was not ready, as its 
economy grew at 3 percentage points higher than Germany, the strongest economy in the 
Eurozone, and yet shared the same interest rates. The ECB matched Germany’s interest rates 
and kept it at a low level while Spain suffered high amounts of inflation and although it needed 
high interest rates to stabilize its economy, the ECB continued to stay on Germany’s level 
(Authers, 20). Similar situations caused imbalances and growing divergence between Euro 
holding members.  
 Similarly, member states lacked similar morals; moreover, the way in which they manage 
their finances greatly differs but deeply affect one another. Reckless amounts of credit were 
deeply entangled and flowed throughout all member states, so when the growing bubble burst, 
and there was no more credit, everyone was affected. Debtor countries such as Greece, Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal, and Italy had no money to pay back creditor countries like France and Germany, 
ultimately creating a domino effect, weakening all members. The possibility of a chain reaction 
throughout the eurozone, should one country default was a possibility.  
 The financial calamities were not able to be addressed individually, instead the costs 
were shared between everyone regardless of their position as a debtor or creditor country. 
Economic instability issues such as these would regularly be tamed via quantitative easing, but 
by giving up control of sovereign monetary policy Eurozone countries’ monetary union constrain 
 
them from doing so (Authers, 14). Quantitative easing allows for a country to simply print more 
money and pump it back into the system in order to encourage market participants to spend 
more, and ultimately boost back the economy see figure 1 (web). Without any control to 













 It did not take too long for the financial crisis to turn into a debt crisis, as several member 
states failed to repay or finance their government debt, (see figure 2). Regrettably, these figures 
reached a high amount before EU officials decided to act on the issue. European Union leaders 
Figure 1 Quantitative easing has been performed by countries such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom to boost the economy in the past. Sourced from 
BBC.com 
 
focused their attention on bailing out banks affected by the global crisis and implementing new 
policies to act as safety nets and regulate the banks, insurances, and markets.        
 One notable work was the one written by a former IMF boss and French central bank 
governor, Jacques de Larosìere. The report provided a proposal to the European Commission, 
advising that supervision should not be limited to individual firms but on a macro level to all 
financial sectors. The submission was made in 2009 and eventually lead to the creation of four 
bodies in charge of regulating banks, insurance and markets as well as the establishment of the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) two years later (Peet and La Guardia, 41). The ESRB is 
responsible for overseeing the European Union’s financial system and preventing systemic risk, 
acting as a much-needed shield (web).  
 Meanwhile, Greece, was racking up national bond yields, continuing since 2007 (Peet and 
La Guardia, 42). The country was soon put under surveillance by the European Commission for 
going over the 3% deficit limit, at one point this figure reached 12.7%.  Prior to joining the 
Eurozone, Greek finances were never well to begin with, and with the new access to large 
amounts of credit rather than invest in capital, heavier debt was accumulated. The Greek crisis 
was so severe, the possibility of Greece being kicked out of the Eurozone or the EU itself was a 
serious option (web).  
 A bailout was inevitable for Greece and would be the first country to undergo a bailout 
program from the newly formed Troika, made up of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
European Commission, and the ECB. In an effort to prevent Greece from going bankrupt loans 
from the Troika began flowing in. The first bailout program was in 2010 with Greece receiving 
 
110 billion euros. Two years later there was a second bailout of 130 billion euros. Greece did not 
simply receive this money:  deficit reduction, tax raises, and other fundamental changes were 
necessary in order to receive these large sums of money. The third bailout came in the summer 
of 2015 for 86 billion euros, in exchange for even more modifications. The total sum of 326 
billion euros was hoped to be spend in investment and boosting of the economy, instead the 
majority of it was spent in repaying the mass amounts of debt that still continues to grow (web). 
This leads to the assumption that debt reconstruction is what needs to be worked on in order to 
stabilize the economy and the euro.  
  
 
Figure 21The financial crisis turned into a debt crisis in the early 2010's. Sourced from:  data.OECD.org   
 
 Germany was right to worry about the disparity among the economies of Eurozone 
members. One of the two flaws the European Monetary Union (EMU) failed to anticipate, state 
Dinan et al., is the high amount of capital flow among nations of different economic levels as well 
as the fact that these transactions went unchecked (134). The second flaw was the delay in 
prices and wages across the Eurozone, leaving these countries in long periods of imbalances and 
far from optimal allocation of its resources.  
 The aftermath of the Eurozone financial crisis raises the question: will the euro survive? 
On one hand, member economies have from the beginning been growing on different speeds 
and to this day maintain different rhythms with a divide between debtor and creditor nations. 
This point of dissention could potentially lead to the more powerful financially stable forming 
their own currency club, leaving the Southern countries to fend for themselves (Marsh, 23).  On 
the other, there is still the possibility for political reformation and integrating even further one 
more time.  
 The Euro is capable of surviving, but only with the willingness of member states to 
sacrifice a greater share of their sovereignty. The main issue is that there is a monetary union, 
without a fiscal union, an economy cannot function as such. Issuing a fiscal policy does have the 
potential of higher taxes being imposed, but a democratic oversight will raise Europe’s market 
credibility (web). Furthermore, member states are skeptical about giving up even more of their 




Common Foreign Security Policy 
  The Eurozone crisis penalties have spread outside of the banking sector; further, the 
issue has reached a considerable size for an extended period of time that it has diverted the 
attention of other vital matters of the EU, consequently slowing down its potential progress. A 
number of advances have been cut short including agricultural and energy policies, and even the 
single market (Peet and La Guardia, 135). The section that can no longer hold off form being 
ignored, though, is its defense sector.  
With the rise in terrorist attacks, a decrease in the military volume of the EU, border 
conflicts such as Russia’s assailment to the Ukraine, and a new President in the United States, 
the need for a renovation in the EU’s security is more than ever crucial. German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel has asserted this in January of 2017, stressing that it is Europe was “facing one of 
its biggest challenges for decades” (web).  
Currently, the defense of the European Union is primarily made up of British and French 
forces. This means that once the UK finalizes its exit from the European Union, it will lose half of 
its military capabilities (Yesilada et al, 57). In doing so, this will pressure reliance on to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States, but comes with concern. Merkel has 
public voiced these worries and the level of commitment from the US but more specifically from 
Donald Trump. The American President has openly criticized NATO on numerous occasions, 
leaving ambiguous feelings over his commitment to the treaty (web).  
 The way that CFSP is managed as of now, fails to achieve economies of scale; further, 
there are many defense resources in Europe but are allocated inefficiently. This is resultant of 
 
member states monitoring their own defense businesses. A coordinated Europe whose defense 
is operated by a more functioning CFSP will be able to hold its place along other global powers. 















Figure 2 With the loss of the UK, the EU will have to create its own independent military 
capabilities. Source: Global Power Transition and the Future of the European Union. 
 
 The need for a collective approach on security measures are barred by financial 
limitations no one is willing to Financial limitations are in the way of the EU and raising its 
defense force; moreover, the absence of the UK includes in monetary contributions. It is 
essential, though, for member states to overlook the costs in exchange for the benefits. The EU 
is advanced in many ways, though its military sector is not at the same level. It must not be left 
behind as global powers, notably China and India, continue to rise.  
 
BREXIT 
 Being a member of the EU means that nations enjoy multiple benefits such as 
participating in the common market, but it also comes with a series of obligations to fulfill. These 
obligations, such as allowing other EU citizens to travel within EU countries, are put in place for a 
progressive and integrated Europe, and while most EU members are in agreement with many of 
the membership criteria there are nations who do not.  
 The United Kingdom has always had a bumpy relationship with the EU; moreover, there 
have been times where the UK has grumbled when it’s their turn to take their share of the 
responsibility. While the past has shown instances where the UK displayed a lack in commitment 
to the EU, such as refusing to convert to the Euro. It was more apparent than ever, though, when 
the immigration crisis ascended. With UK citizen’s discontent voicing louder, Former UK prime 
minister, David Cameron proposed a deal to the public. In exchange for re-election in 2015, the 















Cameron retained his promise on renegotiations which quickly escalated to an all in or out 
situation. Cameron remained hopeful as he campaigned for a “Britain Stronger in Europe”, but 
when the referendum results came in June 2016 with a 51.89% vote to leave, he was forced to 
resign. His replacement, Theresa May, who was also in favor to remain in the EU, is now the 
designated to oversee the BREXIT process, one which has never happened before. Although the 
Figure 3 The UK will have to address the countries who wished to remain in the EU. 
Source: thepoliticalidealist.wordpress.com 
 
remaining 27-member states were eager to begin the negotiations with the UK, May held off for 
almost a year as the nation needed all the time they could get to prepare themselves. 
 On March 29th, 2017 Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty was triggered: the UK has two years 
to work out an agreement regarding its exit from the EU. In twenty-four months, all existing 
treaties between the UK and the EU must be reviewed until both parties establish new 
agreements (web).  Although two-year period can potentially be extended through a unanimous 
agreement of EU members, if an agreement is not reached within the allotted time-frame, The 
UK will be forced to leave empty handed.  
 There are many negotiations to take place, but there are a few that are of more 
importance. The UK will have to face new trading relations with the entire world, new relations 
with the EU, they will have to deal internally with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar whom 
voted to remain in the union, and immigration with the EU. The UK will not be able to pick and 
choose between what benefits they would like to keep and what obligations they wish to give 
up: access to the single market but refusing to allow refugees into their country. This quite 
possibly could be what can and has been delaying the negotiations to progress. The following 
sections will explain said issues and the potential outcomes of each.  
 Currently the United Kingdom’s relationship to the majority of the world is as a part of 
the European Union. Once the time frame of Article 50 has expired, trading agreements as an 
individual nation must be established with everyone it currently trades with. The most 
prominent relationship it will have to reestablish is, of course, with the EU itself as both parties 
have grown to depend on the other for both trade and employment labor. The range of how the 
 
exit process might be handled ranges between what has been labeled as a “hard” exit or a “soft” 
exit (web). There is no definite explanation to either of these exits, but a “hard” exit could 
potentially be a situation in which no agreements are reached and the UK is treated as an 
outsider country from the EU with multiple barriers to trade. On the other hand, a “soft” exit is 
the opposite, where agreements similar to those currently in place will be applied (web).  
 It is not in the benefit of either party to reach a “hard” exit as both economies will 
regress. Despite the mutual dependency from both sides, the EU will have a higher influence in 
the negotiations. From 2011-2015 The UK the average in total trade was 23.1 percent of the UK’s 
economic output, reports Yeşilada et al. (53). The top three EU nations, however, do not have 
the same degree of reliance on UK trade relative to their individual GDP, where the highest is 
only 3.9 percent of its GDP. The UK will have to comply to many of the EU’s demands as a large 
portion of its economy relies on the current trade level with the EU, failure to do so will result in 
costly barriers.  
 New trading agreements are not limited to the EU, but similarly with the rest of the 
world; moreover, it must reestablish its status with the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an 
independent nation and not part of the EU. The WTO provides rules and guidelines for trade 
agreements among nations, additionally it is mediator who settles any trading disputes (web).  
 One major issue which drove many UK citizens to secede was the rising inflow of 
migrants, not only from the middle East and North Africa, but EU citizens as well, confirm 
Yeşilada et al. (53). As it currently stands, all citizens of the EU have the ability to participate in 
the freedom of movement: individuals are free to work, live, and attend schools in countries 
 
outside the one they were born in.  both the EU and the UK rely on each other for filling gaps in 
the workforce and students. Yeşilada et al. explain that in 2015 roughly 5 percent of the UK 
population was made up by non-British EU citizens accounting for 7 percent of the workforce 
while the rest of the EU contained 1.2 million British citizens participating in its own workforce 
(53). Putting these figures into perspective, it is probable both the EU and the UK will attempt to 
reach an agreement that take into account the current workforce and students.  
Additionally, the UK must address its own national issues, notably with Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and Gibraltar. These countries had a majority vote to remain in the EU in the 
2016 referendum, see image three. These regions could potentially be forced to resign from the 
EU when it was primarily the British vote who decided. Resultingly, the severity of having their  
 
 
Figure 4 A divide in the referendum is evident. 
 
voices heard has lead at least one country to threaten with a referendum of their own from 
Scotland. Although it is, currently the only country that has strongly enunciated this option, there 
is a chance of a domino effect from other UK regions.                     
 Following BREXIT, the EU will have a series of new gaps and issues to tend to, explains 
Dinan et al. The UK is an influential asset to the European Union and losing this experienced 
resource will leave negative effects (94).  Furthermore, there are financial repercussions for the 
EU: the UK’s contribution to the budget which was roughly 8.6 billion pounds in 2016 (web). 
Perceptibly, the remaining 27 EU members will have to pick up the left tab or the EU will have to 
readjust its current budget. 
 Finally, there is the fear that additional EU members will follow BREXIT’s lead or 
Scotland’s threats. At the end of 2017, Catalonia held an unofficial referendum with the aim of 
seceding from Spain (web).  
 
Conclusion 
The European Union faces a series of issues all of which are put to test how united the 
group is willing to be. The three challenges discussed in this report are ongoing; furthermore, 
they are matters with no clear answers or leaders who have experienced it.  The Euro is no 
longer at risk of defaulting, but the Eurozone debt crisis remains a puzzle for EU officials to ease. 
Too much time spent on the matter, though, hurt the potential progress the EU could have 
reached. The EU must now catch up, as other global powers continue to advance at rapid paces.  
 
As much as the European Union is willing and ready to advance, a great deal of the 
deciding factors remains out of their hands. The CFSP is a matter that depends on third party 
factors: progress in the defensive sector will have to wait until the United Kingdom has made his 
exit from the EU. Following the withdrawal, the question of NATO remains: will Europe depend 
on the United States for assistance or will focus on strengthening its own defense? The largest 
question of all is how and when Brexit will end. Discussions over the existing treaties between 
the two parties remain in motion, but the agreements reached are few.  
Now more than ever is the time for members of the EU to let go of the fear of 
transferring sovereignty power and immerse in order to progress politically and economically. 
There is still time to not only save euro but to strengthen the union, if quick measures are taken. 
It is important for them to come together and establish a supranational fiscal policy, the lack of 
one was the core reason European economies both in and out of the Eurozone collapsed.  
 The European Union has already advanced in its financial sector, implementing stronger 
measures to keep the Eurozone and its currency secured. However, the ongoing debt crisis has 
already created a divide among the creditor and debtor nations; moreover, this could lead to 
smaller divisions of Europe. While taking integration, unofficial disintegration has additionally 
followed.   
  The deeper one digs into the structure of the union the more complex it becomes. It is 
made up of a number of different languages and cultures that have to work together, although 
these differences are the reason for its success. Many of these issues are open ended questions 
 
of which there is no correct answer. It is only through working together that they will be able to 
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